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Abstract: We begin with an admittedly simplistic statement: “civilization” is best 
represented by the increased availability of utility providing goods and services. In other 
words, civilization is synonymous with economic development. This paper concerns three 
questions. First, how does civilization develop? Second, what is time preference and how 
does it affect the development of civilization, or what we may call the “process of 
civilization.” Third, what factors affect time preference, and how do changes in time 
preference affect this civilizing process? Through these three questions, we provide the 
theoretical why civilization developed, instead of the more common historical how 
civilization actually developed. 
JEL Codes: O12; O19 
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Time Preference and the Process of Civilization 
 
1 Introduction 
How civilization developed is a common question with many ambiguous, location-
dependent, or time-dependent theories. McNeill (1963) stressed the importance of 
communication networks, especially via sea, in expanding the trade relationships (“foreign 
stimuli”) that fostered the process of civilization. In his pioneering work in Figurational 
Sociology, Elias (1969-82) attributed the historical developments of civilization to 
alterations to the then-prevailing social attitudes. As thresholds for shame and repugnance 
were altered, whether endogenously through more interconnected social relations or 
exogenously through an increasingly centralized state presence, attitudes towards what are 
now regarded as anti-social norms (e.g., regarding violence, sexual behavior, table 
manners, speech, etc.) were altered to usher in an increasingly civilized society. Proponents 
of the world-systems analysis approach to civilization see the macro-development of the 
world as a result of increasing division of labor, dividing the world broadly into core and 
periphery countries and allowing the core countries to focus on high-skilled and intensive 
productive enterprises (Wallerstein 1974-2011).  
 In a similar vein, Collingwood (1942: esp. part III) relates the development of 
civilization to the forming of stronger communities by way of a shared collective 
experience (p. 283). More to the point, as any conception of “civilization” must involve 
some ideal state, it is a process of the mind dependent on the social norms defining the 
construct. Indeed, even if such an ideal state involves notions of humans being able to 
satiate all the material “needs” they desire from the natural world, the state of civility will 
still be a mental construct as such “needs” are themselves not nature-given but results of the 
mind (p. 294). Ultimately all betterments to civilization must stem from a combination of 
two (or three) factors: the process through which individuals in the community resort less 
to force with each other (i.e., form a stronger collective), the process through which the 
community harnesses its ability to obtain the necessaries and luxuries it demands from the 
natural world (i.e., satiates its needs, however defined, better), and finally, the process of 
accepting outsiders of the community as insiders entitled to the same aforementioned 
civilities (i.e., opening up the resultant civility to those unexposed to it).   
Economic science treats the question of how civilization develops in more material 
terms than the two aforementioned approaches. New Institutional Economics takes the view 
that instead of being merely periphery to economic development, the quality of institutions 
– economic, political, judicial, etc. – is central to explaining divergent growth rates in 
various civilizations (North 1981, 1990). Although answering “how” civilization developed 
is important, it masks the initial civilizing spark in place of some proximate results. 2 
 One novel approach to the question of “why civilization developed” looks to the 
concept of “time preference” – the ability to renunciate present want satisfaction in lieu of a 
greater amount of future want satisfaction. We augment this sparse literature on the 
influence of time preference on development in two ways.  
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 Most theories as to how civilization developed are relatively recent contributions. The historical emphasis 
was on explaining how some civilizations stagnated and entered periods of decivilization. Khaldun (1377) 
focused on barbarian invasions; Gibbon (1776-89) attributed the decline and fall of the Roman Empire to 
internal decay, artificially supported by exploitive conquests; Spengler (1922) similarly focused on mature 
civilizations naturally turning to imperialistic plutocracies unable to sustain their overreaching ventures; 
Toynbee (1934-61) viewed the cultural “elite” that initially civilized a society as being responsible for its 
downfall when they became a parasitic “elite.” More recently Diamond (2005) has suggested that civilizations 
decay due to environmental damage caused by overexpansion, climate change making the civilization 
unsuitable for its new natural world, an overdependence on long-distance trade to sustain the domestic 
populations increased demands, increasing levels of violence (e.g., war), and erroneous responses that try to 
rectify these aforementioned problems. 
First, we outline how time preference gives rise to the “process of civilization.” This 
process is broadly defined as the accumulation of productive goods giving rise to a general 
increase in productivity that allows for either: 1) increased leisure time to maintain the 
same quality and quantity of life, or 2) an increased quality and quantity of life from the 
same amount of labor. These results are important as theories of civilization define it 
implicitly in terms of greater amount of want-satisfying goods or a greater amount of 
leisure time to contemplate concerns in life beyond the superficial physical world (“self-
actualization” to borrow Maslow´s (1943) term). Increased productivity encourages both.  
Second, we enumerate the factors that affect time preference rates – both for the 
individual and for society at large. Economic, juridical and moral institutions all function to 
decrease our time preference schedules, thus allowing for advancements in the process of 
civilization. We also show that these institutions can negatively affect our time preference 
by increasing it, and thus retard this same process of civilization.  
Finally, as a consequence of the theoretical foundation that time preference provides 
for the process of civilization, we are in a position to answer the question of how 
civilization develops. While one defining characteristic of the civilized society over its 
uncivilized counterpart is the availability of labor-saving devices that increase our 
productivity and thus, our quality and quantity of life, we see that this development can 
only be made through continual investment. In turn, this investment in the more developed 
future depends on savings in the present, which are in turn only possible through a lowering 
of one’s time preference. The institutional factors discussed enable us to provide the micro-
foundations to answer the common question of how it is that society civilizes itself.  
 2 The Process of Civilization 
What properly constitutes a “civilization” is as contested as the process by which it comes 
about. Traditional views on what is, exactly, a civilization have rested on the vague notion 
of advanced cultures in contrast to primitive ones (Wright 2004). In more concrete 
renditions, “advanced cultures” are given attributes such as a separation or domination over 
the natural world (Fernandez Armesto 2001), domestication of humans or other organisms 
(Wright 2004), higher or more complex levels of communication (Llobera 2003: 136-37), 
or an increased ability to live under ever more highly populated conditions, i.e., increased 
urbanization, as in Haviland et al (2008: 250). Alternatively, one may look at more material 
factors such as an increased specialization through the division of labor (Wright 2004; 
Haviland et al. 2008), large-scale architectural achievements (Llobera 2003), or an ability 
to pursue geographically expansive ventures, e.g., long-distance travel or trade (Wright 
2004).  
 What all these diverse viewpoints share in common is a reliance, whether explicit or 
implicit, on material advancements in the amount of want-satisfying goods available. As 
economic progress occurs so too does “civilization” by way of the increased means 
available to achieve physical satisfaction or through an increase in leisure time to consider 
more altruistic or intangible desires.3 Thus, we accept and start our analysis with the notion 
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 One could claim that a decrease in the pursuit of physical satisfaction (such as monks or pilgrims 
renunciating the comforts of life) would ameliorate the former condition and allow one to devote full attention 
to the latter. We downplay this possibility because it occurs in only a seemingly small portion of the 
population, and also that it is clear that these individuals are unable to renunciate all their physical needs 
(Hülsmann 2002: 80-81). 
of “civilization” as increased material living standards through the mundane process of 
economic development.4  
In order to understand how civilization develops, it is instructive to start with the 
isolated and simple case of a man, Robinson Crusoe, stranded on a deserted island without 
any tools at his disposal except his bare hands.5 
To survive and maintain his life, Crusoe must find a means of sustenance in the 
wild, e.g., berries. Assume he spends 10 hours a day picking berries, which brings him just 
enough food to survive. Being alone on the island with no ready tools at his disposal, it is 
all but impossible for him to improve his situation beyond this most primitive stage and he 
has to live, so to speak, from hand to mouth. Lacking an exogenous influence, he will likely 
be stuck forever at a subsistence level.  
Suppose that after some time on the island he stumbles upon a more abundant field 
of berries, and now only needs to spend 9 hours a day to meet his survival needs. He now 
has two choices. Either he can still spend 10 hours a day picking berries, and consume the 
greater amount of berries, or he can forego the extra consumption and dedicate the extra 
hour to producing something else, e.g., a stick, that he thinks will further increase the 
amount of berries he can pick, or, which is the same, reduce the amount of time he has to 
                                                 
4
 One could levy the charge, as one referee did, that we herein claim dominance of the causal thesis that the 
concept of civilization is the foundation of economic activity, and not vice versa (as would be the case in, e.g., 
Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651). As will be shown later, the emergence of both the concepts of civilization (at least, 
our preferred definition of it) and economic activity can be explained by a singular causal factor – time 
preference, and the ability to forego immediate gratification in the expectation of a greater satisfaction in the 
future.   
5
 Although popularized by Böhm-Bawerk (1959), “Crusoe economics” has been a staple in explaining 
complex social situations since at least the French philosopher Frédéric Bastiat (1850). 
spend picking berries. The restriction on consumption is called saving and the creation of 
the stick, which is a capital good, is called investment.6  
If Crusoe is correct in his expectations, he will be able to pick the necessary amount 
of berries in a shorter amount of time after the production of the stick (after investing). This 
will leave more time for other productive purposes and open up new possibilities to 
improve his living standards further. Alternatively, Crusoe could spend the newly freed 
time pursuing non-productive but no less satisfying activities, such as appreciating the 
sunset, bird watching or reading Treasure Island. Whether Crusoe spends his time on 
increasing his productivity to free more time in the future, or to enjoy his time in the 
present, makes no difference. In both cases he has a greater amount of options available to 
him from which he can select which will provide the most satisfaction and thus directly or 
indirectly increase his standard of living. This increase in living standards is what we refer 
to herein as civilization, and “saving and the resulting accumulation of capital goods are at 
the beginning of every attempt to improve the material conditions of man; they are the 
foundation of human civilization” (Mises 1998: 260). 
 
3 Time Preference the Process of Civilization 
One important factor was omitted from the previous discussion: time. When Crusoe 
foregoes consumption, he is really foregoing consumption in the present in order to be able 
to consume more in the future. In more modern financial terms, we say that when someone 
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 Rothbard (2007: 48) gives a good overview of this process. Strigl (2000: 9, 13,16, and passim) analogously 
refers to a saved supply of berries as the “subsistence fund” – savings that allow for sustenance while 
investment projects are being completed and a focus can re-shift back to providing consumption goods.  
saves in the present, they are really “saving up for something” in the future (Garrison 2001: 
40, 62). 
There is a further restriction on how much investment can be undertaken in the 
present. Not only are savings requisite, but with the recognition of mortality Crusoe must 
realize that time is finite, and must be dealt with just like other scarce means. It is 
preferable to have a need satisfied sooner rather than later. This relation between 
satisfaction in the present versus the future is called time preference. 
Those with very low time preference have very long time horizons, i.e., they don’t 
mind foregoing consumption in the present for even a very small increase in future 
satisfaction. A typical example of this is the miser, always saving and never spending. 
However it should be clear that not even in this extreme case is the miser’s time preference 
zero. We know this to be the case, since if it was not so, he would always accumulate and 
never consume or enjoy. He would not consume today, but he would not consume 
tomorrow either, and since he at least needs to eat and drink in order to survive his time 
preference rate will always stay above zero (Mises 1998: 481). 
It is time preference that determines an individual’s consumption-investment ratio. 
The lower the rate of time preference, the more will be saved and invested, which in turn 
will lead to more advanced production processes with a higher degree of productivity. In 
turn, production and the availability of goods in the present will increase, and, ceteris 
paribus, the marginal utility of present goods will decrease relative to that of future goods 
(Hoppe 2001: 6). More resources will be saved and invested than in past periods, thus 
increasing future income. This will result in an even further potential decrease in time 
preference. We can call this self-reinforcing spiral “the process of civilization” (Hoppe 
2001: 7, 10-12, 74-75, and passim). 
Before creating the stick, Crusoe managed to pick just enough berries in 9 hours 
every day to keep him alive, leaving 1 hour every day to pick more berries or invest in a 
capital good that would increase his future income (measured in berries). He chose to invest 
in the making of the stick.  
When deciding whether he should “invest” in the stick he faced other possibilities. 
The water around the island was full of fish which would provide a better source of food, 
but Crusoe can only take advantage of this opportunity with the aid of a net. Crusoe 
estimates that the creation of the net would take a total of 20 hours of work, whereas 
searching and locating the proper stick only took 5 hours. In order for Crusoe to create the 
net, which would provide a more highly valued source of food, he would have to forego a 
full 20 days of berry consumption, whereas the creation of the stick meant only foregoing 5 
days of consumption. That Crusoe produced the stick signifies that Crusoe deemed the 20 
hour cost of the net as too high.  
Now assume that the creation of the stick allowed Crusoe to pick the same amount 
of berries that previously took him 9 hours in only 5 hours. He now has 5 hours every day 
to spend at activities other than berry picking. Assuming that he has to spend one hour 
every day to keep his stick in an intact condition, the other 4 hours could be spent creating 
the fish net, which given these new circumstances would now only take 5 days in total.7 
What was previously viewed as being too costly may now become affordable. The good 
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 This time required keeping his stick intact is analogous to depreciation. Crusoe’s stick depreciation is thus 
one hour of work per day, or one stick every 24 days. 
that was previously deemed to lie too far in the future and entailed too high a sacrifice is 
now deemed to be both affordable and desirable. It has moved closer to Crusoe in time, or 
which is the same thing, his time horizon has been lengthened, and his time preference has 
been lowered.8 
4 Factors Affecting Time Preference 
The process of civilization is a self-reinforcing spiral, whereby saving and investment lead 
to an increased future income, which in turn lead to a decrease in time preference and an 
increase in saving and investment. Hence, over time there is an inverse relationship 
between the real level of income and the rate of social time preference. 
4.1 Personal factors 
The first factor to affect an individual’s time preference is his purely subjective and 
individual valuations: his preferences. A worrier constantly concerned with the future can 
be said to have a low time preference. The hedonist living in the moment can be said to 
have a very high time preference. 
4.2 Biological factors 
As time is scarce owing to the finite nature of human life, an individual’s time preference 
differs from another’s depending on how scarce their remaining life is. Children typically 
have extremely high rates of time preference, as illustrated by their generally low ability to 
delay present consumption for a much greater future amount (Mischel’s marshmallow 
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 An historical example of this is the steam engine, which actually dates back to the first century AD, however 
at that time the level of savings needed to build it was too high. It wasn’t until many hundred years later when 
enough capital had been accumulated that the making of the steam engine became possible. 
experiments at Stanford perhaps exemplify this phenomenon).9 This arises for four reasons. 
First, children have a longer life expectancy than adults (both because of their young age, 
and the fact that life expectancies have been generally increasing over time).10 As a result, 
the same amount of real-time waiting comprises a smaller percentage of a child’s life than 
an adult’s (Gruber et al.: 54; Ukraintseva 2001). Second, a child´s income is strictly limited 
relative to an adult’s, thus constraining the process of civilization that lowers time 
preference, as discussed in section 3. Third, children perceive time to pass more quickly, 
making the cost of waiting a given amount of real time seem higher than for an adult 
experiencing a slower passage of time. This arises from a perception of time’s passage 
quickening when it involves greater knowledge perception (Macar et al. 1994; Block and 
Zakay 1997; Block et al.: 1998), and also when a task is not repetitive or tedious as with 
the routinization created by age and experience (Watt 1991). Finally, children and 
especially young children are not cognizant of death as the end of their time.11  
 As a child develops into an adult these four factors change and the individual’s rate 
of time preference continually diminishes. Entering old age may start to change this trend 
again, as the elderly revert to a form of infancy in several key ways. First, their income may 
decline. As the end of life approaches, there is increased uncertainty that if one delays 
consumption today they will be alive to enjoy the fruits of the wait. The end of time for an 
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 Follow-up studies to Mischel’s original experiment found a correlation between children who were able to 
delay gratification as children undergoing the marshmallow test and general success (as determined by 
competence assessments and SAT scores) later in life (Mischel et al. 1972; Shoda et al. 1990).  
10
 Increasing life expectancies also allow for more distant goals to be added to an individual’s value scale, 
thus reducing his time preference. It is not the physical lengthening of time that creates this effect, however, 
but the individual’s perception of this occurrence (Hoppe 2001: 7). 
11
 Three- to five-year old children regard death as a temporary state, and only accidental to a person’s life. 
After five years of age, children gradually gain knowledge that death is “final, inevitable, and personal” 
(Grollman 1967: 98, 101). As time preference can only arise if time itself is finite, the perception of an 
infinite amount of time negates the ability of one to prefer events later to sooner. 
individual’s friends may reinforce the idea of finite life and increase their propensity to 
consume today (a reversal of the invincibility of youth).  
 This effect may be suspended, or counteracted by an individual realizing that his 
economic life extends beyond his physical life. This may arise from the fact of procreation 
that gives an individual offspring whose lives he may wish to consider as he plans his own 
consumption patterns (Hoppe 2011: 4-5), or from an individual using a charity or trust to 
extend his present income into the future beyond his physical life.  
 
4.3 Environmental or external factors 
Environmental or external factors can be classified in two ways. The first are those “events 
in an actors’ physical environment whose outcome he can neither directly nor indirectly 
control” (Hoppe: 2001: 3). Since they are out of the actors’ control they only affect his time 
preference insofar as they are expected, and they can be divided into positive and negative 
events.  
Positive events, such as manna falling from heaven, will, to the extent they are 
expected, temporarily raise the time preference rate and stimulate consumption, until after 
the event has passed and the time preference rate will fall and savings will increase. 
Negative events, such as a flood, again to the extent they are expected, will have the 
opposite effect: temporarily lowering the time preference rate before the event, with 
increased savings as a result of attempting to protect oneself from the event. After the event 
has passed, the rate of time preference rate will rise, and savings will decrease.  
The second factor is the general conditions which an individual finds himself. These 
general conditions can also be divided in two. 
The first is the relative certainty of the environment that surrounds the actor. In a stable 
and more certain environment the future is more easily planned for, and thus the time 
preference rate will tend to be lower. This arises because it is easier to assess the tradeoff 
between curtailing consumption today and the expected satisfaction an individual will 
receive from the increased level of future consumption. The more uncertain the surrounding 
environment is, the higher the time preference would tend to be. 
The second is the relative scarcity in the surrounding environment. In environments of 
abundance, where “nature provides”, there is little need to save at all. Life in these areas, 
ceteris paribus, would be one of high time preference, and a resultant existence of living 
from hand to mouth. Only to the extent that there exists a relative scarcity of goods and 
time is saving necessitated. It is also clear that at any given time there exists a definite limit 
to this. For saving to be encouraged it must first be possible. In environments of such 
immense scarcity that all saving is impossible, high time preferences and a life lived “from 
hand to mouth” will be encouraged, or indeed necessitated, just like in the case of the 
environment of abundance, although this life of immense scarcity would be one of an 
arguably less pleasant nature.12  
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 The level of scarcity necessary to prohibit the initial stages of the process of civilization may be sufficiently 
low as to be a non-binding constraint in most of the modern world. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Easterly and 
Levine (2003) find that endowments of climate, germs and crops do not affect development directly, but only 
indirectly through the available institutions. In other words, bad luck with endowments does not retard or stop 
growth, but may if institutions to deal with them are poorly developed.  
4.4 Institutional factors 
Time preference is closely related to the concepts of certainty and uncertainty. While 
perceived increases in uncertainty also increase an individual’s time preference, alert 
entrepreneurship within effective institutions can combat this affect (Huerta de Soto 2010: 
22). 
We can divide institutions into two groups: social and anti-social. What is common to 
all social institutions is that they have spontaneously and peacefully evolved, with the 
intention of decreasing perceived future uncertainty,13 making social cooperation easier, 
and creating the accompanying result of lowering time preference. Social institutions keep 
their position and continued existence based mainly on merit: those that lose their stature as 
beneficial institutions are replaced by better functioning ones.14  
Not all institutions obtain and retain their position by merit alone, and this is the 
common denominator of all anti-social institutions; they retain their position by force or 
violence. Instead of being means to combat uncertainty to aid civilization, anti-social 
institutions become ends in themselves (Shaffer 2009: 10-11). They become harmful to 
social cooperation and development, and as a result raise time preference as this is reflected 
in real income levels. 
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 Shaffer (2009) discusses the evolution of social institutions as attempts to reduce the analogous concept of 
entropy.   
14
 Evolved social institutions also include evolutionary legal systems, as discussed below (sec. 4.4.2). 
 4.4.1 Economic institutions 
The institution of money, being arguably the most important and foremost social 
institution, evolved spontaneously and voluntarily as that good which best served as a 
medium of exchange (Menger 1892). As barter involves high transaction costs, an 
evolution occurred whereby few and eventually one good was selected to exchange against 
all other goods. As exchange was simplified in the money economy, investment and 
production increased, along with the resultant levels of real income. As production 
increased, the purchasing power of money also increased, thus reducing the reservation 
demand for it. Analogous to this occurrence is a decrease in an individual’s effective rate of 
time preference (Hoppe 2006: 79). 
The evolution of the money economy enabled other institutions to develop, such as 
the banking system. This further decreased time preference rates, as banking facilitated 
saving and investing, which served to foster increased real income levels. Banking also 
served to make the institution of money more certain, as it increased the security and 
availability of an individual’s cash savings (Bagus and Howden forthcoming).   
Popular sentiment regards money as the root of all evil. Yet money qua money is 
neither good nor bad – it is only a means to enable trade and facilitate savings. The 
common practice of controlling the supply of money while obliging its use through legal 
tender laws (effectively changing it from a social to anti-social institution) does have 
ethical implications—mostly negative—through wealth redistributions and the propagation 
of economic cycles (Hülsmann 2008; Bagus et al. 2011). Less visible is the discouragement 
of savings that inflationary policies cause, which analogously can be represented as an 
increase in time preference. 
Once it is understood that inflation reduces the purchasing power of money 
systematically, we see that it is quite similar to the problem of saving in a barter economy. 
Goods selected as money have definite properties – they are easily divisible, universally (or 
at least widely) valued, portable, uniform, durable and scarce. Perhaps most important, the 
good cannot spoil quickly as this negates the usefulness of using it as an indirect exchange 
medium. In an inflationary economy, money that is saved will, as time passes, become 
more and more “spoiled”, just like goods in a barter economy, because it will become 
increasingly less useful in exchange.15 As an inflated money loses its value, people will 
increasingly spend it in order to obtain something “real” (Mises 1998: 562); consumption is 
encouraged and saving penalized. A constant and ongoing inflation will thus have the effect 
of reducing both present income and future income, and will raise time preference rates and 
shift time preference scales upwards. Inflation counteracts the beneficial characteristics of 
money that made a lower time preference rate possible.  
4.4.2 Juridical institutions 
Juridical institutions have evolved spontaneously with the purpose of avoiding the 
incidence of conflict, or when a conflict nonetheless has occurred, to reduce and efficiently 
solve its resolution. This is most apparent perhaps in the Anglo-Saxon common law 
tradition, which sees law as a fluid progression. It is also true that the civil law which grew 
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 Note that, paradoxically perhaps, some anti-social institutions may increase our certainty and thus reduce 
our time preference. Legal tender laws that oblige the use of a currency in a given area also reduce 
competitive forces that might diminish inflationary pressures (Hülsmann 2008: 145-58). The increased 
inflationary pressures created by legal tender laws will counteract against the decreased uncertainty that a 
given money unit will be accepted in a future exchange, thus leaving ambiguous the total affect on an 
individual’s (or society’s) rate of time preference.  
from Ancient Rome evolved within narrowly defined constructs of justice and fairness 
(Leoni 1961, Hayek 1973).16 Law is a fundamental institution in managing uncertainty as it 
resolves conflicts and increases certainty in the scope of the results of our actions towards 
others, as well as those of others on us.17  
One such law-based institution is private property which is necessitated by the scarcity 
of goods (Hoppe 2010: 18), and which likely evolved among our ancient forefathers when 
the increase in the size of population was not met by a proportional increase of wealth 
(Hoppe 2012). When our ancient forefathers were unable to solve problems of 
overpopulation by breaking off from the main group, the institutions of private property 
evolved as a peaceful and voluntary way of solving the conflicts that would arise regarding 
scarce resources.  
Private property, for example, solves this conflict by answering the question, “Who 
owns what, when and why?” Knowing that the fruits of your labor are yours and will not be 
expropriated lowers time preference (Mulligan 2007). This happens from a combination of 
effects. First, claims to property in the future are strengthened and an individual can save 
today with confidence that he can consume this forgone consumption later. Second, 
empirical evidence suggests strong institutions protecting private property affect our 
willingness to labor in the present, thus increasing present real income (La Porta et al. 
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 Huerta de Soto goes on to further point out that “juridical institutions, and in general all social institutions 
(language, money, the market, etc.), arise from evolutionary processes in which a vast number of people 
individually contribute throughout history their own small bit of practical information and entrepreneurial 
creativity and thus spontaneously give rise, in accordance with Menger’s well-known theory, to institutions 
which are without a doubt the product of the interaction between many people, though these institutions have 
not been consciously designed nor organized by any person. [...] Thus the paradoxical truth that those 
institutions (linguistic, economic, legal, and moral) which are most important and essential to the life of man 
in society could not be deliberately created by man himself, since he lacks the necessary intellectual 
capacity.” Compare with (ibid.: 40-41). 
17
 As laws and norms exist to reduce conflict, any norm that generates conflict rather than helping to avoid it 
is contrary to the very purpose of the law. “It is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion” (Hoppe 2011). 
1998, 1999). If we consider the opposite case—that of a highly unstable juridical 
framework, or one that generates conflict rather than solves it—we realize the tendency this 
creates to raise time preference. The future becomes less certain to plan for (thus 
compromising our ability to estimate the value of future consumption), and an individual 
lacks reassurance that any savings today will translate into an exercisable claim to future 
consumption.18 
A voluntary institution that has evolved for the purpose of solving conflict yet fails to 
achieve its goal and even incites conflict would, ceteris paribus, be abandoned and better, 
i.e., more efficiently or functional, institutions would emerge. Yet conditions change when 
we remove the voluntariness and peacefulness, and add a violent, and thus anti-social, 
element to the equation. This violence can be divided in two ways: acts that are intermittent 
and illegitimate (e.g., crime) and, more importantly, acts that are institutionalized and 
legitimized (e.g., declared wars). 
Crime has the distinguishing mark of being seen as illegitimate in the eyes of not only 
the victim but also the rest of society, and thus to defend oneself against the criminal is 
considered a right, as is the right to punish and extract compensation from the offender 
(Hoppe 2001: 11). Crime reduces an individual’s present amount of goods and raises his 
time preference. Yet, just as in the case of natural disasters, if the risk of crime can be 
perceived people can act accordingly and allocate their resources to the protection and 
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 Indeed much economic development in less-developed countries takes place in the underground economy, 
since property rights are poorly enforced in the formal economy (de Soto 2000). In countries where property 
rights are only vaguely defined or poorly enforced entrepreneurs have difficulty securing credit to expand 
their business, or even to sell it to the appropriate buyer. As a result, development is low and a large amount 
of capital (estimated by de Soto (2000: 32) to amount to more than $10 trillion worldwide) remains “dead” in 
a state of inefficient underutilization.  
prevention from crime (e.g., they can build walls, fences, install alarms, arm themselves, 
buy insurance, etc.).19  
These protections imply a reduction in present goods, and a higher time preference will 
follow.20 However, since crimes are considered to be illegitimate, and since defending 
oneself against them is permitted, they will only have a temporary and unsystematic effect. 
While people will save and invest less because of a reduced real income, their tastes or 
specific time preference scales will not change as a result. Thus, after what is deemed to be 
sufficient protection against crime has been provided for, the process of civilization 
resumes. 
As the state is the territorial monopolist on ultimate decision making (Hoppe 1989: 182-
83)—whether de jure or de facto—it is the only institution that can partake in “legitimized” 
crime. This occurs most frequently in cases of war where rights are suspended or actions 
are permitted that are otherwise illegitimate. It is also apparent in simpler cases, e.g., taxes 
enforced by the threat of fines or imprisonment (Schumpeter 1942: 198), the threat of 
eminent domain, or by enacting what Hayek (1973) refers to as legislation as distinct from 
naturally evolved or agreed upon laws. 
As a result of this the state affects time preferences in a distinctly different way than 
crime. Since they are created and not evolved actions, they can be highly uncertain and 
subject to change. Uncertainty about future tax rates can depress investment activity today, 
a situation we can refer to as “regime uncertainty” (Higgs 1997). Since there is no direct 
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 Note that in order to protect oneself from these crimes, they must be non-serially correlated, and hence 
insurable events. Legitimized aggressions, as in the case of state-sponsored crimes (e.g., genocide, war, etc.), 
sever this link. Unable to protect oneself from the possibility of being aggressed against, time preference rates 
increase in the present to compensate against a potentially less-secure future 
20
 At the very least, they divert resources from investment that would increase production in subsequent years.  
protection against these activities as in the case of crime,21 individuals will tend to adjust 
their expectations of future returns accordingly. The very act of legislation increases the 
degree of uncertainty, since what is wrong today might not be wrong tomorrow (Smith 
1988). This less stable environment of a shifting legal framework will thus have the same 
impact on an individual’s time preference as, e.g., an increase in natural disasters or an 
increase in criminal behavior. The future is rendered relatively more uncertain, and thus the 
individual’s time preference scale will increase.22  
Thus we can conclude that the state not only changes the amount of present income 
(through taxation), which leads to a higher time preference rate, but also changes the 
amount of future income to be expected, reinforcing this increase. As it also creates a less 
certain environment by enacting legislation, it furthermore leads to a higher time preference 
scale. Three reinforcing effects thus serve to raise the rate of time preference through 
legitimized state interventions, and thus have a distinctly de-civilizing effect on society.23  
 
4.4.3 Moral institutions  
While environmental factors are highly important in reducing the uncertainty of man’s 
environment, it is clear that the behavior of other men is a constant source of uncertainty as 
well. Moral institutions have evolved in order to deal with the uncertainty of people’s 
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 By definition you are not allowed to defend yourself against “legitimized” aggressions. 
22
 Hayek (1960: 143) further distinguishes between those relatively certain state activities and those that are 
uncertain. Taxation is relatively certain, at least in the sense that rates are known in advance in most instances 
and payment is at the same frequency. Conscription of all men between ages 18-21, although not avoidable, if 
continually enforced would allow for some degree of planning to mitigate its effects.  
23
 This process of de-civilization is a self-reinforcing spiral just like the previous process of civilization. As 
present incomes are reduced, time preference rates are raised, leading to further reductions in savings. 
behaviors. Chief among these, though by no means the only forms of moral institutions, are 
religion, the family unit, and behavioral norms. 
 In the tragedy of the commons, individuals are unwilling to delay resource use to 
promote sustainability because of the opportunity cost of doing so. Overutilization imperils 
those scarce common resources that cannot be protected for technological reasons (e.g., air, 
oceans) or legal reasons (e.g., public lands). While the modern way of solving the tragedy 
has moved to regulation, traditionally it was social norms and customs that altered and 
guided people’s behavior and use of these resources (Ostrom 1990, 2005; Cox et al. 2010). 
Rules were established to limit use or to reimburse those negatively affected, and in such a 
way eliminated the overutilization in place of a longer-term orientation that promoted 
sustainability (Blomquist et al.1994; Ostrom 1999: 510).  
Institutions may also take a religious form, meant to instill a certain predictability in the 
way people act, as well as trying to extend the time horizon of the individual beyond his 
own death.  
The Christian concept of life after death had the effect that the time horizon an 
individual considers is lengthened beyond his physical life. Even during the first 
millennium, Christianity’s focus on the impending end of the world functioned to keep time 
preferences centered more closely on the present than would otherwise have been the case. 
With the changing attitudes among Church leaders and laypersons that the ultimate end of 
all earthly things was not impending, a shift out in time horizons occurred with the result 
that time preferences gradually began decreasing (Mises 1998: 527). 
The institution of marriage and family can also be said to have a stabilizing and 
certainty-making element to it that tends to reduce time preference and encourage savings. 
Earlier we pointed to the fact that man’s time preference was conditioned by his physical 
life, but also that given the biological fact of procreation he could extend his time horizon. 
This is mainly done through the institution of the family (Smith 1988: 25). As Joseph 
Schumpeter notes  
the capitalist order entrusts the long-run interests of society to the upper strata of the 
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie work primarily in order to invest, and it was not so 
much a standard of consumption as a standard of accumulation that the bourgeoisie 
struggled for and tried to defend against governments that took the short-run view. 
With the decline of the driving power supplied by the family motive, the 
businessman’s time-horizon shrinks, roughly, to the life expectation. (1942: 60-61, 
emphases added) 
The family makes it possible for time preferences to extend beyond death, and from 
this we would expect that a society of stable family morals would affect the social time 
preference by lowering it.  
Closely related to family morals are sexual morals. Sigmund Freud argued that the 
basis of civilized behavior is dependent upon limitations being placed upon sexual behavior 
(Smith 1988: 31), and as Pitirim Sorokin (1972: 107 and 130) points out: “Any notable 
achievement requires long training, persistent labour, and concentration … The result is 
that little time and energy can be spent in pursuit of sexual thrills.”  
Since moral institutions have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and to lower 
time preferences, thus benefitting the process of civilization, we would expect to see a rise 
in social time preference to occur were these institutions to be counteracted or completely 
broken down. 
 
5 Effects of changes in time preference 
The behavior of individuals is uniquely related to their time horizons. Individuals oriented 
to the long term and having lower time preference, will adapt their behavior in the present 
in order to gain a potential benefit in the future. Even if potential benefits could be had in 
the short run, in the long run it pays off to be peaceful, honest, polite and well-mannered 
since people will trust you more and show you the same behavior in return. In short, these 
civilized behaviors create bonds and trust, and thus make possible potentially stronger 
friendships and relationships. All these behaviors are also to some extent self-reinforcing: 
politeness, honesty, trust, etc. beget politeness, honesty, trust, etc.  
Personal health is also closely related to time preference, for many of the same 
reasons. More long-term thinking means reducing some potential present “thrills” in order 
to have more of a future, which is to say a longer life, and as we have seen, a longer life 
expectancy is related to lower time preference. Eating well, exercising, little or no drug use 
and so on are conducive to long-term health and tend to be related to people with lower 
time preferences. 
On the other hand, individuals that have relatively short time horizons and think 
more in the short term tend to be more distrustful and untrustworthy, impolite, unpleasant, 
and bad-mannered as the fear of a feedback mechanism coming back to punish you for your 
deceitful and impolite behavior in the future is not taken into account. Less attention is paid 
to the potential long-term effects of this behavior. This behavior is self-reinforcing as well, 
with the result that closer and stronger friendships and relationships are made relatively 
more difficult. Those who lament the increasing “coldness” of society fail to take into 
account the real reasons for this.24 Owing to shorter time horizons and less concern about 
the future they also tend to partake in riskier and more self-destructive behavior such as 
smoking, excessive drinking, drug use, tattoos, and extreme sports.  
Where the social time preference rate is high, and time horizons are accordingly 
short, spending and consumption are encouraged, not thrift. The social and economic order 
of consumerism is commonly identified and decried in today’s developed world, yet the 
reason why is misunderstood. That people seem to lavishly spend money on consumerist 
products is not a result of aggressive advertising or planned obsolescence.25 These are 
instead the inevitable result of the very sickness that lies behind seemingly senseless 
spending; inflation, and the resultant higher time preference rates. As people’s time 
preference rates are raised, planning becomes increasingly short sighted, and as a result of 
this they demand less durable goods. The lamented consumption society is a result of high 
time preference rates and the process of de-civilization, both set in motion by inflation.26 
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 More recent studies finding e.g., declining empathy among young adults, have pointed to social isolation in 
an increasingly digital world as the culprit (Konrath et al. 2011; Perry and Szalavitz 2011). While this 
rationale may explain the more recent reported shift to less empathic youth, it does not explain similar 
attitudes prevalent in past societies or even in less technologically advanced modern societies.  
25
 Kirkpatrick (1997: chap. 3) confronts the idea that advertising is a coercive force unduly affecting 
consumers’ behavior. Reisman (1998: 214-16) argues that planned obsolescence is not inevitable but rather 
the result of competitive move to offer improved goods faster than a competitor.  
26
 This effect may be most pronounced among society’s younger generation, as they tend not to realize that 
inflation is happening for lack of perspective on how far prices have diverged from their historical values. 
Mises (1942: 105), writing about the Weimer German hyperinflation of 1922-23, noted that a result of the 
When the future becomes more and more uncertain the present obtains an ever 
higher value relative to the future. Instead of saving and planning for the future, wild and 
irresponsible speculation and gambling are encouraged. Again we see that the common 
consensus about the negative effects regarding the “gambling” and “wild speculation” 
occurring e.g., on Wall Street, seem to have pinpointed the symptoms of a disease, yet it 
has failed to diagnose the patient correctly. Again the problem lies in higher time 
preferences as a result of inflation.  
We can also see effects of time preference in art and culture. Leaving aside 
considerations as to what constitutes good art or culture, it needs to be pointed out that 
without leisure time, no art, or in general no culture, can develop beyond a very primitive 
stage. Leisure time is of course a result of a higher productivity and a higher standard of 
living, which must be the result of a low social time preference rate. Thus, in societies with 
lower social time preference more time can be spent in cultural activities, and where the 
social time preference rate is higher, comparatively less time can be dedicated to these 
activities.  
Finally, while higher time preferences by no means are equivalent with crime, 
neither are low time preferences equivalent with the non-existence of crime. Rather the 
crimes as such change in nature. As can be expected, crimes related to high time 
preferences are crimes with a short time horizon, that require little or no planning; in short, 
petty crimes, crimes of passion, robberies etc. Crimes related to low time preferences 
                                                                                                                                                    
inflation was to “shock the foundations of [the] country’s social structure” and that the youth came to “learn 
to live in the present and scorn those who try to teach them ‘old-fashioned’ morality and thrift.” Bagus and 
Howden (2011: 70-71) given an applied example via the recent Icelandic example of an inflationary boom 
and the effects this had on the general mentality towards savings and delayed gratification, especially amongst 
the youth.  
instead are those with longer time horizons, more intricacies, which need relatively more 
planning. 
6 Conclusion 
The beginning of this paper provided a theoretical foundation to explain how civilizations 
can and must develop. The key concept in the development of civilization is savings, which 
makes investment and production possible. The amount of savings and investment is 
determined by time preference, where lower time preferences result in an increasing 
amount of savings and production, which in turn lowers time preferences further. This self-
reinforcing spiral of increasing civilization and increasingly higher standards of living is 
called the “process of civilization”.  
Personal, biological, environmental and institutional factors were shown to affect 
people’s time preference rates. We saw that the concept of time preference was closely 
related to certainty and uncertainty. Social institutions (economic, juridical and moral) 
evolved in order to deal with the ineradicable uncertainty that man faces in his everyday 
life, and they have a civilizing and time preference reducing effect on society. Anti-social 
institutions, on the other hand, tend to have the opposite effect.  
Lastly, we looked at various effects that changes in time preferences would have. 
Societies with lower time preference would be expected to be more wealthy and civilized, 
with more cultural activity, and a lower degree of crime in general and aggressive crime in 
particular. Societies with higher time preference would be expected to be less wealthy and 
civilized, and have a higher degree of crime in general and of aggressive crime in 
particular. Due to their less wealthy nature they would also have less leisure time and as a 
consequence of this, less time to spend on cultural development.  
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